Forget about Beijing, Doha (and the rest of the Gulf) follows D.C.'s drumbeat

While my last post examined the growing economic relationship between China and Qatar, the reality is that the U.S. is still a dominant influence in the emirate, especially on matters of security.  Recent revelations about a proposed U.S. "missile shield" to be housed in Qatar, the UAE, and Kuwait are the latest example of the Pentagon's total militarization of the Gulf littoral.  To quote the New York Times on the hellish blitzkrieg of missiles the U.S. and its allies can now "defensively" launch across one of the world's most vital and heavily trafficked waterways:

Three weeks ago the Pentagon announced the newest addition to Persian Gulf missile defense systems, informing Congress of a plan to sell Kuwait $4.2 billion in weaponry, including 60 Patriot Advanced Capability missiles, 20 launching platforms and 4 radars. This will be in addition to Kuwait’s arsenal of 350 Patriot missiles bought between 2007 and 2010.

 The United Arab Emirates acquired more than $12 billion in missile defense systems in the past four years, documents show. In December, the Pentagon announced a contract to provide the Emirates with two advanced missile defense launchers for a system called the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, valued at about $2 billion, including radars and command systems. An accompanying contract to supply an arsenal of interceptor missiles for the system was valued at another $2 billion, according to Pentagon documents.Saudi Arabia also has bought a significant arsenal of Patriot systems, the latest being $1.7 billion in upgrades last year.

The United States’ own military forces provide a core capability for ballistic missile defenses in the Persian Gulf, in particular the American Navy vessels with advanced tracking radars and interceptor missiles. According to Navy officials, these Aegis missile defense systems, carried aboard both cruisers and destroyers, are in the region on continuous deployments.

And the United States has deployed a number of land-based missile defense systems to defend specific American military facilities located around the gulf.

Qatar's role in the new missile defense proposal is to host an X-band radar station, similar to U.S. controlled radars established at Mount Keren, in Israel's Negev Desert, and at Turkey's southeastern city of Malatya.

It is hard not to smirk when one hears the phrase "missile defense," as it has been a Pentagon buzzword for going on thirty years now.  The idea of shooting missiles down with other missiles is compelling--note the fantastical original nickname of "Star-Wars"--so much so that the United States has spent over $200 billion investing in the program over the last 30 years.  Does it work?  The official answer is who knows? (but probably not).  The U.S. system has never been tested under combat conditions.  And "combat conditions" have never occurred because the whole theory was based on defending an attack by the Soviet's that never came.

So why are the Gulf kingdoms now so gung-ho about buying their own missile shield?  The answer is hard to tease out.  A "an attack from Iran" is the official answer, the sheiks quaking in their sandals theory.  But both Iran and the Arab states have too much invested in the Gulf oil trade for this theory to hold much water.  One would think that any conflict that arose in the Gulf would not reach the point where hundreds of interceptor missiles are needed to prevent bombs raining on Dubai and Riyahd.  The Arab families ruling the Gulf care far to much about preserving their power and wealth for total war to break out in the area (war in other Arab states, however, is a different question).

A better answer may be the all-powerful military industrial complex.  Donald Rumsfeld chairing a blue-ribbon committee on a subject, as he did on Missile Defense in the 1990's, is about as close to President Eisenhower's definition of "the acquisition of unwarranted influence" as you can get.  That is how $200 billion gets spent on an experiment, and no one really calls bullshit.  Not mentioned in the New York Times quote above is that Lockheed-Martin produces the Patriot Missile System, and Raytheon the X-band radar.  The oil rich Gulf states have always been the best customer for these mega weapons manufacturers, and the latest purchases could just be a continuation down this path.  And I am sure Lockheed appreciates the continuing business, as the U.S. is currently broke and hoping to reduce its defense budget (either through a managed snipping, or "sequestration"-a top down haircut of many billions that will take effect if a congressional compromise can't be reached).  

China in the Arabian Gulf: Qatar

Introduction: China in the Persian Gulf, the past twenty years

The last decade has seen a major growth in China’s relationship with the oil rich Arab kingdoms west of the Persian Gulf.  On China’s part, this relationship is no doubt born out of their insatiable need for energy supplies.  Starting in 1993, when China became a net importer of energy, the Beijing government has adopted a “go out” strategy in its foreign policy, aiming to secure reliable energy and other resources abroad.  In an April 2011 study for the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Christina Lin writes this has turned “historical routes into a modern grid of pipelines, roads, and railways for its energy supplies.” Lin continues:

This approach stems in part from Beijing’s fears of a U.S. blockade on maritime supplies in the event of hos­tilities over Taiwan. It also reflects the reality of rapidly growing Chinese energy demand.  An August 2010 report showed that China had become the world’s number-one energy consumer, surpassing the United States. In addition, the coun­try has enjoyed double-digit annual growth for most of the past decade, fueled not by consumer demand, but by energy-intensive heavy industry and infra­structure construction as well as growing demand in the transportation sector.[i]

In 1994, the Persian Gulf region supplied barely a quarter of China’s oil imports, all from Oman, with a majority of Chinese oil coming from Indonesia or from domestic productions.  However, by 2001 added oil from Saudi Arabia and Iran began to bring the gulf’s share of Chinese oil deliveries up to 50% of total imports, with Saudi Arabia being China’s largest supplier. [ii]  Since that time, China has become the Gulf’s largest energy customer, and a very important one as recessions slow the west and North America has begun to develop its own domestic shale gas production (replacing imports).  A report by Chris Zambellis lays out the stark new reality of China’s energy appetite in the Gulf:

In 2009, Saudi oil exports to the United States - for the first time in over 20 years - dropped below the 1 million barrels per day (bpd) mark. In contrast, Saudi oil exports to China during the same time frame surpassed 1 million bpd, almost twice the amount of oil exported by Saudi Arabia to China in 2008.  In June 2008, China surpassed Japan as Kuwait's top destination for oil exports. The UAE is another important source of oil for China, which has been the top importer of Omani oil for six years running. With around 10% of its LNG exports heading to China, Qatar has also emerged as an important source of Beijing's growing LNG needs amid stagnant demand in the United States.[iii]

One interesting facet of these energy relationships is that China now runs a trading deficit with the Gulf States, an unusual position for export-giant Beijing to be in.  Except for in the UAE, China is buying more Arab oil and gas than it is exporting goods and services to the Gulf, leaving a large surplus of Chinese payments in Dubai and Doha.    For Beijing, their most recent strategy, which will be explored below, is to make sure that those payments are made in the Chinese national currency, the Renminbi, also known as the Yuan.

Qatar

During this time, the state of Qatar has emerged as in important player in the Gulf across a multitude of matters. Ruled since independence in 1971 by the al-Thani monarchy, Qatar’s capital of Doha now has international heft on matters of Middle East diplomacy, the petrochemical trade, U.S. military posture, international media, and Western intellectual influence in the Arab world.  And in terms of energy reserves, ever important for determining pecking order in the region, Qatar has the world’s third largest supply of natural gas, sharing with Iran territorial rights to a giant offshore deposit, known as North Field in Qatar’s portion and South Pars in Iran’s.  The North Field has turned Qatar’s small population of 800,000 into the wealthiest citizens on earth per capita.

Historically, Qatar has always been under the domain and guidance of the West, whether that be the London Colonial Office or Washington D.C.  Since the 1991 Gulf War, the al-Thanis have eagerly worked with the Pentagon to establishing military bases on the Gulf peninsula. Starting in 1996 the al-Udied airbase was constructed for a Qatari airforce that did not exist, and upon completion was leased out to the Pentagon.  In 2001, the U.S. very quietly began building up al-Udied as a U.S. base, prepositioning materials and handing out construction contracts.  In a March 2001 Department of Defense report to Congress titled “Allied Contributions to the Common Defense,” it was written:

Since November 1995, Bahrain and Qatar have both hosted several Air Expeditionary Force deployments in support of Operation SOUTHERN WATCH, and the United States Air Force recently established a limited prepositioning facility at Qatar’s Al-Udeid Airbase and is investigating moving to the airfield. Qatar also hosts prepositioned U.S. Army assets at As-Saliyah.[iv]

It is important to note the date of this statement, as al-Udeid airbase is often described as being opened as a result of post 9/11 U.S. policy, with the first soldiers flying into a dusty desert airstrip in late September.  However, the above statement and a number of contracts handed out before the September terrorist attacks make clear that the Bush administration was planning a U.S. base at Al-Udeid (and regime change in Iraq) from the moment it took office.[v]  Al-Udeid remained a “secret” base until its buildup became too big to hide in the spring of 2002, when Vice President Cheney made a well-publicized visit to the base.